Ahmadinejad vs. Khamenei
By Ali Alfoneh
May 2, 2011, 1:02 pm
http://blog.american.com/2011/05/ahmadinejad-versus-khamenei/
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad marked his return to office by presiding over the May 1 cabinet session after a two-week long absence from the limelight. Ahmadinejad called his absence “distance working” from home because of “reasons” he said he would rather keep to himself. However, Ahmadinejad also provided a coded explanation: “I am convinced and believe that a strong and powerful president would lead to dignity of the Leadership and especially the nation. A strong president can stand firm as a defensive shield, advance affairs of the state and bring dignity upon it. All leaders and executives are in need of strong arms.”
Ahmadinejad’s call for greater presidential authority is a subtle reference to his aborted April 17 sacking of Intelligence Minister Hojjat al-Eslam Heydar Moslehi. Appointing and dismissing cabinet ministers is a constitutional presidential prerogative, but less than an hour after Ahmadinejad’s decree appeared in the media, Fars News Agency reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had “opposed” the “resignation” of the intelligence minister and that Moslehi would, therefore, remain in the cabinet. Khamenei’s unconstitutional overruling of Ahmadinejad has ignited the latest round in this struggle for power between the president and the Supreme Leader.
Despite Ahmadinejad’s return to politics, the conflict seems far from over: According to Fars News, Moslehi was absent from the cabinet meeting due to a visit to the holy city of Qom. The conflict will likely continue throughout the remainder of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and will doubtless escalate as Ahmadinejad’s supporters begin to question the unrestricted powers of Khamenei as Guardian Jurist and head of state during parliamentary elections in 2011 and next year’s presidential election.
Thirty-two years after the revolution of 1979, public support for rule by the clergy in Iran has waned to unprecedented levels. Ahmadinejad, who is well aware that clerical support for his government is no longer an asset but a liability in the eyes of most Iranians, has chosen confrontation with Khamenei as a means of mobilizing the masses. In the past, Iranian voters have often voted the enemy of their enemy into office. In 1997, for example, Mohammad Khatami was elected president with 20 million votes. More than electoral support for Khatami, the vote reflected opposition to Ali-Akbar Nateq Nouri, whose candidacy had been embraced by Khamenei.
There is no guarantee that Ahmadinejad’s tactics will resonate with Iranian voters. The memory of the fraudulent 2009 presidential election is still fresh. On the other hand, Khamenei can hardly be expected to give in to Ahmadinejad’s advances. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad correctly view the issue of who will head the intelligence ministry as a zero-sum game that neither can afford to lose. However, the struggle for power among civilian politicians may benefit a third party—the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which could solidify its position as the final arbiter of power in the Islamic Republic.
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