hi orda,
okay.
countdown thinks tc is more secure than the current system but is insecure against the state (and possibly companies like ms). i think he's right.
rudiger weiss, a german professor of security, thinks the same thing. "Explosive , for example, the fact that the secret key generated during the manufacturing process, external to the chip and then transferred into the chip. Here it is trivial to make a copy of all keys. It is not excluded that such legislation exist and these must not be reported."
steven sprague also said that tpm is not designed to be secure against government intrusion. he set it in a fourth amendment context but we know the nsa thinks its powers give it a free pass through the need for reasonable suspicion. at least with respect to anyone within three relational hops of a person of whom they are suspicious.
one suspect, one pizza, one giant network of connected people. http://gigaom.com/2013/12/17/how-feds-use-one-seed-and-3-hops-to-spy-on-nearly-everyone/
surely you have contemplated the use of ndas and other formal legal restraints to prevent the disclosure you notice is absent. it is only because snowden breached his contract that we know what we know. and see what happened to him.
there's no way that nsa has made a decision to quit broad surveillance. there's not a glimmer of a statement from general alexander that this is the plan. indeed, he is the same alexander whose express intent is to ensure nsa has access to all information in every device and over every network.
there ain't no way tpms secure a person's privacy against the government.
and where control of the tpm is secured by a colony manager such as a carrier or an enterprise, there's little security for the end user.
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