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Msg. 49526 of 65535
(This msg. is a reply to 49510 by killthecat) |
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ktc, I'm pretty sure I read sworn of the nuclear materials found were undeclared, or "secret." Either way, he ws poised to go at the drop of a pin. Here's some material that might interest you: 500 tons were removed from Iraqhttp://www.truthorfiction.com/rumors/u/uraniumyellowcake.htm US reveals Iraq nuclear operation Along with 1.77 tons of enriched uranium, about 1,000 "highly radioactive sources" were also removed. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3872201.stm
Testimony by Charles Duelfer on Iraqi WMD Programs
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/tenet_testimony_03302004.html One significant effort illustrating this was a high-speed rail gun program under the direction of two senior scientists associated with Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons program. Documents from this project show that the scientists were developing a rail gun designed to achieve speeds of 2-10 kilometers per second. The ostensible purpose for this research was development of an air defense gun, but these speeds are what are necessary to conduct experiments of metals compressing together at high speed as they do in a nuclear detonation. Scientists refer to these experiments as “equation of state” measurements. Not only were these scientists developing a rail gun, but their laboratory also contained documents describing diagnostic techniques that are important for nuclear weapons experiments, such as flash x-ray radiography, laser velocimetry, and high-speed photography. Other documents found outside the laboratory described a high-voltage switch that can be used to detonate a nuclear weapon, laser detonation, nuclear fusion, radiation measurement, and radiation safety. These fields are certainly not related to air defense. It is this combination of topics that makes us suspect this lab was intentionally focused on research applicable for nuclear weapons development. We continued our efforts to determine if Iraq was seeking to develop technologies for a uranium enrichment capability. Iraq’s efforts to procure high tolerance aluminum tubes were examined. Ostensibly these tubes were for small rockets, but the manufacturing tolerances specified were much higher than would normally be required for this purpose. Technical reasons for the high tolerances were explained by a number of Iraqis associated with their acquisition, but there are still a number of discrepancies to examine with regard to these tubes. Again, we need to determine what these activities mean.
The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program from leaving either their jobs or Iraq. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received significant pay raises in a bid to retain them, and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a bid to ensure that Iraq retained technical knowledge. . . .
The Iraqis first chose not to disclose the extent of their clandestine nuclear program in their April 1991 declaration. As part of a denial and deception effort at the end of May 1991, Kamil issued orders to collect all documents and equipment indicating Non-Proliferation Treaty violations. Equipment and documentation were moved to a variety of locations to hide program elements from the IAEA. Iraqi researchers were instructed by their managers to dispose of their laboratories, some of which were then set up in universities and institutes. In addition, Kamil ordered that at least one set of all nuclear-related documents and some equipment be retained by a senior scientist. Iraq collaborated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to produce a series of Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) statements, including a “final” presented to the IAEA in September 1996 . . . In the year prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), MIC undertook improvements to technology in several areas that could have been applied to a renewed centrifuge program for uranium enrichment. These dual-use technologies included projects to acquire a magnet production line at Al Tahadi, carbon fiber filament winding equipment for missile fabrication at al Karama, and the creation of a new Department of Rotating Machinery at Ibn Yunis. All of these projects were created to improve specific military or commercial products, but the technologies could have help support a centrifuge development project. ISG, however, has uncovered no indication that Iraq had resumed fissile material or nuclear weapon research and development activities since 1991. . . . Dr. Huwaysh recalled that in 2001 and 2002 the frequency of meetings between Saddam and Iraqi nuclear scientists increased. During the same time frame, Saddam also issued a Presidential Order to the President of the IAEC, Dr. Fadil Al-Janabi, that he should keep nuclear scientists together at the IAEC in order to pool their skills and have them available when needed for starting numerous new projects. Dr. Huwaysh did not know the specific details of any of these projects. . . . Saddam’s increased interest in the IAEC and publicity of IAEC achievements, increased funding, and infrastructure improvements prompted Dr. Huwaysh to speculate that Saddam was interested in restarting a nuclear weapons program. Disconfirmations Disconfirmed: Saddam Had Nuke Program "How many nuclear weapons can you build [with 500 tons of yellowcake]? The answer is 142." http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/07/disconfirmations_disconfirmed.html
Iraq's Efforts to Acquire Information about Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Related Technologies from the United States Inside Saddam's secret nuclear program A senior Iraqi scientist tells how Saddam Hussein, in a decades-long quest for the bomb, systematically hoodwinked the IAEA.
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