http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20111222.aspx
December 22, 2011: Lessons have been learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and over the last decade the U.S. Army has been revamping its training and operating manuals to reflect what was learned (or, often, relearned). The army has dozens of manuals, pamphlets, and other documents detailing how the troops should be trained and how they should fight. All these are being brought up to date with what has been learned recently. Most of what is being lost is speculative stuff added in the 1990s, after the Cold War ended, and the army foresaw a future in which technology would change everything. Tech did bring many changes but not always as anticipated. Combat and a live (not imaginary) enemy impose a reality that often cannot be predicted.
For example, five years ago the army completed a revision of its counterinsurgency (COIN) manual for the first time in twenty years. The new manual, FM 3-24, was accurate but caused controversy. It had become a matter of faith for many Americans that no matter what happened in Iraq or Afghanistan it was a defeat for America and the United States was doomed to lose. Yet the U.S. found ways to deal with everything the Islamic and sectarian terrorists could come up with. Iraq and Afghanistan were very different situations but American troops adapted and prevailed in both. The biggest problem turned out to be agreeing on exactly what "victory" was.
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