TeeCee: Maybe this rendition of what Kent and I investigated, uncovered, and pursued will demonstrate exactly how IDCC is a competitive threat, not only to Q, but, with the Nortel auction, IMO, it blew apart the MENS strategy. It really is tumbling down now.
Kent sent me this summary and, as you can determine, there was a concerted effort to address 4G IPR (LTE) much the same as MENS stonewalled 3G rates (with DOJ's blessing in 2002). The auction upset it all.
Food for thought:
LTE % (essential)... according to source, IDCC #1
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=58696101
PLUS
42% WCDMA (3G)... from an R&D standpoint, WCDMA standards were in full bloom by 2006...
...appears many having trouble distinguishing air interface (radio) patents.. (essential) from overall declared patents attributed to any given company on the Bekkers paper...my take from the Bekkers 2011 follow-on was IDCC jumped ahead of # 1 Nokia (2006) in declared essential WCDMA patents using complex criteria cited in 2011 paper...
once again, the 2002 WCDMA Nokia/Ericsson overt price fixing arrangement, followed by it's 2008
counterpart repeat for LTE comes into play. In a cumulative context, MENS recognized that NPE's Qualcomm and Interdigital posed the greatest threat to the respective royalty caps, given they derived revenues primarily from licensing vice manufacturing/infrastructure.
Generally unnoticed is the PONZI scheme affect approved by the USDOJ, EC, and Japan Fair Trade Commission that benefited non-NPE cross-licensors ahead of NPE essential patent contributors (QCOM/IDCC) both for WCDMA, carried over in 2008 to LTE. In a nutshell, in 2002 the three regulatory agencies approved the 3G3P as the sole pricing standard for mobile wireless industries, while turning a blind eye to a parallel pricing cartel that remains in place nine years later.
In our investigative reports, the 3G3P was referred to as a straw man, given the history of its origin and follow-on marginal role with respect to pricing standards. In the context of a Ponzi scheme pitting the inner circle of aligned major essential patent owners versus their NPE counterparts, Interdigital remains the "last man standing".
Last man standing suggests cumulative 3G handset device royalties, including QCOM's allotment, exceeded the approx 5% announced cap at the 2002 onset.
Jumping ahead to 2011, Nortel upset the 3g valuation playing field by establishing a 4.5BN value for the least no. of essential patents in yesterday's posted charts by Bekkers. From a defensive perspective, Motorola established a separate value for acquirer Google using essential patents, notwithstanding they have declared less than one-half of essential 3G patents to ETSI as Interdigital, including zippo for LTE.
The value of Interdigital's patents is invariably tied to pros and cons of the various offensive/defensive strategies of non-NPE's who generally cross-license. Ongoing and potential infringement-based litigation looms large in this regard.
Monetization issues regarding IDCC are a direct consequence of a non-NPE "inner circle" pricing arrangement outside the 3G3P, both for 3G and LTE.
In a nutshell, Interdigital is a major contributor to 3G and 4G standards, and the true value of the company becomes increasingly evident based on the steadfast reluctance of certain aligned and perhaps unaligned (ZTE/HUAWEI) mobile wireless manufacturers to exceed the varied pricing caps agreed on early on.
| 
