Most of post did not post - attempting to correct.
There have been a lot of claims about 'information' on this collision. The NTSB report(s) is the ONLY one that anyone should consider in the least bit reliable.
Articles or op-eds from the NYT certainly do not fall within the universe of 'reliability'.
I have read the currently released NTSB reports and have not seen any newer, more recent (last couple of weeks) releases.
The following I believe to be a reliable summary of currently available and verifiable information.
NTSB Reports and Information Releases
Preliminary Information Releases (January 30–February 5, 2025)
Dates: January 30, 2025–February 5, 2025
Contents:
January 30, 2025: The NTSB confirmed recovery of the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) from the CRJ700, recovered from the Potomac River. The FDR was in “good condition” and soaked in alcohol to preserve it, with ~2,000 data points expected. The CVR had “water intrusion” but was treated with ionized water and vacuum drying, with investigators confident in recovering audio (pilot conversations, ATC communications, ambient sounds). The Black Hawk’s combined FDR/CVR was also recovered, showing “no signs of exterior damage,” with expectations of full data extraction.
January 31, 2025: NTSB investigator Todd Inman reported ongoing recovery efforts, noting the CRJ700 was found upside down in three pieces and the Black Hawk was mostly intact. The agency began analyzing black box data at its labs, located ~1 mile from the crash site.
February 2, 2025: The NTSB released initial FDR data from the CRJ700, indicating the jet was at ~325 feet (±25 feet) altitude at impact, with pilots attempting to increase pitch (elevators near maximum nose-up) one second before the collision, suggesting an evasive maneuver. The CVR captured a TCAS “traffic, traffic” alert 17 seconds prior, but no resolution advisory due to the low altitude (<900 feet). The Black Hawk’s FDR/CVR showed it was at a radio altitude of 278 feet, above the 200-foot ceiling for Helicopter Route 4. Barometric altitude data was invalid, complicating analysis of what the helicopter crew saw.
February 3, 2025: The NTSB, with the U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage, recovered major CRJ700 wreckage (aft fuselage, right engine, right pylon). Ground-based radar data suggested the Black Hawk was at ~300 feet, reinforcing the altitude violation. The agency noted ATC alerted the helicopter to the CRJ700 two minutes before impact.
February 5, 2025: The NTSB clarified radar data rounding (to the nearest 100 feet) and emphasized the need for more precise Black Hawk altimeter data. All 67 victims’ remains were recovered and identified by this date. The agency stressed synchronizing FDR/CVR data and cautioned against premature conclusions.
Key Details:
Collision Circumstances: The crash occurred at 8:47:59 p.m. EST, ~300 feet altitude, 0.5 miles from Runway 33. The CRJ700 was on final approach, while the Black Hawk was on Helicopter Route 4, a low-altitude corridor along the Potomac’s eastern shore.
ATC Communications: At 8:43 p.m., the CRJ700 accepted a switch to Runway 33. At 8:46 p.m., ATC informed the Black Hawk of the CRJ at 1,200 feet, circling Runway 33. The helicopter crew confirmed visual contact and requested visual separation, approved by ATC. At 8:47 p.m., ATC asked if the Black Hawk had the CRJ in sight; the crew confirmed and requested visual separation again. A “pass behind” instruction 17 seconds before impact was partially missed due to a 0.8-second mic press by a crew member. The instructor pilot believed ATC directed them to the Potomac’s east bank, indicating miscommunication.
Black Hawk Altitude: The 278-foot radio altitude violated the 200-foot ceiling, potentially reducing vertical separation from the CRJ (~325 feet). Invalid barometric altitude data and a non-broadcasting ADS-B system (possibly off or malfunctioning) are under scrutiny.
Investigation Scope: The NTSB is examining ATC workload (one controller handling two roles, deemed “not normal”), pilot decision-making, airspace congestion, and mechanical factors (e.g., Black Hawk altimeter issues).
Sources: Reuters, CNN, NTSB website, Wikipedia, Airways Magazine
Preliminary Report (March 11, 2025)
Date: March 11, 2025
Contents:
Sequence of Events:
At 8:33 p.m., the Black Hawk (PAT25) requested clearance for Helicopter Routes 1 and 4 to Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir. At 8:43 p.m., Flight 5342 checked in on the Mount Vernon visual approach to Runway 1, then accepted Runway 33. At 8:46 p.m., ATC noted the CRJ at 1,200 feet, and the Black Hawk confirmed visual contact. At 8:47 p.m., a conflict alert sounded, and the “pass behind” instruction was issued. The CRJ rolled out on final seven seconds before impact, with a nose-up maneuver one second prior. The collision occurred at 8:47:59 p.m.
Black Hawk Issues: The Black Hawk’s FDR lacked date, time, or positional data, and pressure altitude was invalid, hindering altimeter analysis. The helicopter was steady at 278 feet for at least five seconds before impact, above the 200-foot limit.
ATC and Airspace: The report highlighted a “dangerously narrow vertical separation” between Runway 33’s approach path and Helicopter Route 4. One controller managed both aircraft, and the Black Hawk and CRJ were on different frequencies, preventing direct communication. A history of near-miss alerts at DCA (e.g., April and May 2024 incidents) was noted, with the NTSB criticizing the FAA for not acting on this data.
Urgent Safety Recommendations:
Prohibit helicopter operations on Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge during Runway 15/33 arrivals or departures.
Establish an alternate helicopter route when Route 4 is restricted.
Review similar risks at other U.S. airports.
Investigate U.S. Army ADS-B installation and management on Black Hawks.
Ongoing Analysis: The NTSB planned simulations, additional interviews, and wreckage examination (all major pieces recovered by February 8, 2025) to determine probable cause.
Sources: The Aviationist, View from the Wing, Wikipedia
Conclusions and Current Status
No Final Conclusions: As of April 27, 2025, the NTSB has not issued a final report or determined a probable cause, consistent with the typical 12–24-month timeline for complex investigations. The preliminary report and updates emphasize data collection and safety recommendations, not causation.
Preliminary Findings:
The Black Hawk was flying above the 200-foot ceiling (at 278–300 feet), reducing separation from the CRJ (~325 feet).
Miscommunication occurred, with the Black Hawk crew missing the “pass behind” instruction and possibly misinterpreting ATC’s intent.
The CRJ’s pilots attempted evasion one second before impact, triggered by a TCAS alert, but low-altitude TCAS limitations prevented actionable guidance.
ATC understaffing (one controller for two roles) and the Black Hawk’s non-broadcasting ADS-B system are contributing factors under review.
DCA’s airspace congestion and history of near-misses (e.g., April 2024 JetBlue-Southwest incident) highlight systemic risks.
Safety Actions:
The FAA issued a NOTAM (FDC 5/4379) on February 19, 2025, restricting helicopter traffic over the Potomac near DCA until March 31, 2025, for non-emergency missions. The NTSB seeks a permanent solution.
Runway 33 was closed until February 7, 2025, and salvage operations concluded by February 12, 2025.
...Exuse moi ....
Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good ...
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